ETHICAL SUBJECTIVISM

Ethical subjectivism (sometimes called moral subjectivism or moral non-objectivism) is the meta-ethical view that moral sentences express propositions, that some of these propositions are true, and that the truth or falsity of these propositions depends ineliminably on the actual or hypothetical attitudes of people. 

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Because ethical subjectivism holds that moral statements can be true or false, it is a form of cognitivism (obviously, since it is in the cognivist theories section). However, it stands in opposition to moral realism (the claim that moral propositions refer to objective facts), to error theory (which says that no moral propositions are true in any sense), and to non-cognitivism (which denies that moral statements express propositions at all).

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Ethical subjectivism is actually what is known as a version of moral anti-realism, since it denies the “metaphysical thesis” of moral realism, the idea that moral truths are robust, ordinary facts about the world. Instead, subjectivism says moral truths are based on mental states (beliefs, feelings, attitudes, etc.) of individuals or groups. Moral realism, as a position, usually commits to three theses - which is covered in more detail in the moral realism section of cognitivist theories.

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1. The semantic thesis: moral statements have meaning and express propositions (they can be true or false)

2. The alethic thesis: some moral propositions are actually true.

3. The metaphysical thesis: moral facts have a robust, ordinary status, just like other facts about the world.
    

Moral anti-realism denies at least one of these. Subjectivists deny the third claim (they say moral facts are dependent on mental states). Non-cognitivists deny the first, and error theorists deny the second.

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There’s also debate about whether realism must include the metaphysical thesis. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord has argued that realism should not require mind-independence, since psychological facts can be both mind-dependent and morally relevant. This line of thinking has led to a distinction between robust moral realism (accepts all three theses) and minimal moral realism (accepts only the first two, and is compatible with subjectivism).

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A topic which will be discussed in greater amounts of detail in the moral ontology section of this website is called moral relativism. Moral relativism is different from  subjectivism, though the two are often confused or combined. Relativism says moral statements are true or false relative to the speaker, much like “I am a student at Seton Hall Prep” is true or false depending on who says it. Depending on the variety, moral relativism may index moral truth to a culture (cultural relativism) or to an individual (individualistic relativism). 

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1. Example of cultural relativism: In some cultures, eating dogs is considered an acceptable thing to do, while in other countries (such as the United States) it is considered inappropriate and, I believe, flat-out illegal. 

2. Example of individualistic relativism: One person may believe that lying is ALWAYS wrong, while another thinks lying is acceptable if it makes another person feel good.

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In relativism, moral codes are local to particular groups and are valid only within those codes. This stands opposed to universalism (the idea of a single moral code for everyone).

Ethical subjectivism, however, is not the same thing. Subjectivism says moral truth depends on mental states, but these truths could still be universal, for example, if one person’s or one group’s attitudes determine what is right or wrong for everyone. Some forms of subjectivism fall under cognitivism (truth depends on people’s values, attitudes, or beliefs) while others fall under non-cognitivism (moral statements aren’t true or false at all, they’re just expressions of feeling).

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For example:

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David Hume’s subjectivism says that a trait counts as a virtue if it evokes approval in a sympathetic and rational observer. Roderick Firth’s ideal observer theory says right acts are those approved by an impartial, rational observer. William James held that an end is good just if it is desired by a person (closely linked to ethical egoism). Non-cognitivist subjectivists, like A. J. Ayer with emotivism, claim that saying “Murder is wrong” is just like saying “Murder, boo!” (an expression of disapproval, not a factual claim).

While relativism and subjectivism sometimes get lumped together, they don’t entail each other. A subjectivist might say that whatever their king approves of is right for everyone (making it universal), which would not be relativism. A relativist, on the other hand, might deny subjectivism if they think moral truth comes strictly from the laws of a country (not mental states at all).

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Universalist forms of subjectivism include ideal observer theory. Some people even classify divine command theory as a type of subjectivism, since it bases moral truth on God’s attitudes. Others argue this is mistaken, because divine command theorists typically claim morality is about God’s commands themselves, not God’s mental states.

The term “ethical subjectivism” has not always been used consistently. Historically, it often referred only to the specific view that moral statements are reports of one’s own mental states (for example, “killing is wrong” just means “I disapprove of killing”). While this is one form of subjectivism, it’s not the only one. Because of this ambiguity, some philosophers prefer to use the broader term non-objectivism to capture the position.

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Summary - ethical subjectivism is the cognitivist (and sometimes non-cognitivist) view that moral truths are dependent on mental states like beliefs, attitudes, and feelings. It denies the robust metaphysical claim of moral realism, but it still treats moral statements as meaningful and, in some versions, true or false. It should not be confused with relativism, though the two often overlap in discussion. Philosophers like Hume, Firth, and James provide well-known subjectivist accounts, while emotivism and other non-cognitivist theories represent a different strand of the same general outlook.